I have also heard from some readers (left and right) that “people don’t want anything new this time”. I’m not sure the polling data shows that but it’s an interesting reaction, maybe cynicism.
Well, I might have to disagree with them readers L&R. There are clear indications that there’s sufficient demand for an alternative to either Lula or the Bs, but the quality and discourse of the current options aren’t exciting enough.
One thing to prove my point: try to run an inequality test with the data coming from the last eight monthly election surveys, from three or four pollsters. Either via a Gini exercise or a Lorenz curve, you can find that there’s excessive concentration in just two candidacies (L + Bs). A Gini over 70%. It means the electorate remains pretty much concentrated (polarised) on the two current main options.
Then, there’s another aspect I’d love to point out: pollsters are trying to find ways to show that there’s captive demand for a third way. Today, July 13, pollster Nexus came up with its most innovative experiment so far in recent surveys: it brought to us a classification of the electorate into groups defined by different degrees of anti-Lula and anti-Bolsonaro sentiment.
The initiative directly engages with recent literature on negative partisanship, according to which rejections have come to organise electoral behaviour as much as positive preferences. Having said so, relevant methodological problems persist. Agreement scales suffer from known biases, the cut-off points used to construct the seven groups are not explicitly stated, and the wording of the questions themselves breaks the symmetry between the two poles by including “and your family” in only one of the statements.*
Besides, a nouvelle interpretation presented by Nexus regarding the so-called third way also deserves caution. The difference between the percentage of respondents who want an alternative to polarisation and the percentage actually willing to vote for L and Bs candidates may seem like pent-up demand. Yet, according to Duverger, in highly polarised systems, voters often distinguish ideal preferences from strategic choices. The desire for a third alternative does not imply a willingness to waste a vote considered decisive.
My view: some pollsters are forcing it a little too much. Statistics can never be isolated from the institutional environment that rise to it. So … for pollsters would be great to guide through public opinion, perhaps influence voters to make what the former believe are better choices for a country. But reality is, Brazil is drowning in polarisation and the alternatives are not sexy enough to stir the electorate out of it.
In Brazil we (ought not to) trust.
I have also heard from some readers (left and right) that “people don’t want anything new this time”. I’m not sure the polling data shows that but it’s an interesting reaction, maybe cynicism.
Hey Kevin — how are you doing? Long time no talk.
Well, I might have to disagree with them readers L&R. There are clear indications that there’s sufficient demand for an alternative to either Lula or the Bs, but the quality and discourse of the current options aren’t exciting enough.
One thing to prove my point: try to run an inequality test with the data coming from the last eight monthly election surveys, from three or four pollsters. Either via a Gini exercise or a Lorenz curve, you can find that there’s excessive concentration in just two candidacies (L + Bs). A Gini over 70%. It means the electorate remains pretty much concentrated (polarised) on the two current main options.
Then, there’s another aspect I’d love to point out: pollsters are trying to find ways to show that there’s captive demand for a third way. Today, July 13, pollster Nexus came up with its most innovative experiment so far in recent surveys: it brought to us a classification of the electorate into groups defined by different degrees of anti-Lula and anti-Bolsonaro sentiment.
The initiative directly engages with recent literature on negative partisanship, according to which rejections have come to organise electoral behaviour as much as positive preferences. Having said so, relevant methodological problems persist. Agreement scales suffer from known biases, the cut-off points used to construct the seven groups are not explicitly stated, and the wording of the questions themselves breaks the symmetry between the two poles by including “and your family” in only one of the statements.*
Besides, a nouvelle interpretation presented by Nexus regarding the so-called third way also deserves caution. The difference between the percentage of respondents who want an alternative to polarisation and the percentage actually willing to vote for L and Bs candidates may seem like pent-up demand. Yet, according to Duverger, in highly polarised systems, voters often distinguish ideal preferences from strategic choices. The desire for a third alternative does not imply a willingness to waste a vote considered decisive.
My view: some pollsters are forcing it a little too much. Statistics can never be isolated from the institutional environment that rise to it. So … for pollsters would be great to guide through public opinion, perhaps influence voters to make what the former believe are better choices for a country. But reality is, Brazil is drowning in polarisation and the alternatives are not sexy enough to stir the electorate out of it.
Apologies for the epistle 😂